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Abstract:  
The increasing complexity of EU regulation is resulting in a tangle of contradictory 
decisions and statements, involving also new markets, such as interactive cable televi-
sion, Internet etc. Whereas in the past sector-specific regulation has been applied in a 
discretionary manner in order to correct the rules of the market game, the really chal-
lenging task for the future seems to be the development and implementation of statu-
tory constraints for the regulatory authorities in order to guarantee a predictable regu-
lation of market power. For this purpose the design and implementation of a disaggre-
gated regulatory contract on the statutory level (EU Directives and national law) is 
derived, which should be an essential principle in the EU Review 2006. Its basic com-
ponents consist of limiting regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting the phas-
ing-out potentials, and a disaggregated application of regulatory instruments. In con-
trast, the problem of opportunistic regulatory behaviour with respect to irreversible 
investments can be solved by the application of the already existing statutory con-
straint of the Framework Directive guaranteeing financial viability. 
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1.     Introduction 
 
The liberalization of the telecommunications sector has brought the traditional 
regulatory contract to an end. Its principal components – entry controls, rate 
regulation and utility service obligations (Sidak, Spulber, 1997, p. 113) – have 
undergone a radical reform. Legal entry barriers have been abolished and thus 
the right to serve. At the same time, the right to be served by the traditional mo-
nopolist has been replaced by bidding for the subsidized markets to reveal the 
most efficient supplier financed by a universal service fund (Blankart, Knieps, 
1989, pp. 592-594).  
 
In 1999 the European Commission started a review process in order to consider 
to what extent phasing out of sector-specific market power regulation should 
take place. The key objectives stated at the beginning of the reviewing process 
were the maximization of the application of the general European competition 
law, the minimization of sector-specific regulation, and a rigorous phasing out 
of unnecessary regulation (European Commission, 1998, p. 3). 
 
On 12 July 2000 the European Commission presented its “1999 Review Pack-
age”, with five proposals for Directives of the European Parliament and the 
Council and one proposal for a Regulation. In the meantime these proposals 
have been enacted: an ONP Framework Directive,
1 an Access and Interconnec-
tion Directive,
2 a Licensing Directive,
3 a Universal Service Directive,
4 a Per-
                                                 
1    Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ L108/33, 24. 4. 2002. 
2   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ L108/7, 24.4. 2002. 
3   Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the  authorisation of electronic communications networks and services   
(Authorisation Directive), OJ L108/21, 24.4.2002. 
4   Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on universal service and users‘ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L108/51, 24.4.2002.    2
sonal Data/Protection of Privacy Directive
5, which came into effect in July 
2003. A Proposal for the regulation of unbundled access to the local loop has 




Neither the Framework Directive nor the Access Directive provide a clear-cut 
definition of future sector-specific regulation, in particular, the regulatory basis 
is left to the interpretation of the European Commission. The Framework Direc-
tive provides a new interpretation of the criterion of significant market power, 
moving in the direction of establishing the criterion of dominance on a given 
market as a prerequisite for sector-specific market power regulation. It gives the 
Commission discretionary power to identify a variety of markets for which the 
introduction of sector-specific regulatory measures should at least be considered. 
Both the Framework Directive and the Access Directive leave the planned   
extent of the future sector-specific market power regulation in long-distance net-
works in the dark. Moreover, it remains uncertain to what extent the phasing-out 
potentials of regulating the local loop due to the emergence of new competing 
technologies will be exploited.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 a critical appraisal of the regula-
tory status quo within the EU is provided. Due to the unspecific regulatory obli-
gations of the EU Directives a large scope of discretionary power of the Euro-
pean Commission in defining the regulatory basis is indicated, including the in-
teraction between the European Commission and national regulators. It is dem-
onstrated that the weak, non-binding statutory control of the regulatory agencies 
results in a massive regulatory overkill. In section 3 the need for the design and 
implementation of a disaggregated regulatory contract on the statutory level (EU 
Directives and national law) is shown, which should be an essential principle in 
                                                 
5   Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy  in the elec-
tronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), 
OJ L 201/37, 31.7.2002. 
6   Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L336/4, 30.12.2000.    3
the EU Review 2006. Its basic components consist of limiting regulation to mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting the phasing-out potentials, and a disaggregated 
application of regulatory instruments. Instead of the weak, economically un-
founded criterion of significant market power, the localization of network-
specific market power based on the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks should 
be a central cornerstone for a statutory constraint to discipline the regulatory 
agencies. As a consequence, the regulatory basis should be strictly limited, 




2. A  critical  appraisal  of the regulatory status quo 
 
2.1  The unspecific regulatory obligations based on the EU Directives  
 
The 1999 Review left the future scope of sector-specific regulation undecided. 
The competency to specify the areas as well as the instruments of future market 
power regulation was delegated to the Commission (Framework Directive, Arti-
cle 15). In July 2002, the European Commission published its Guidelines focus-
sing on the characterisation of markets for which sector-specific regulation 
might be considered to be necessary in the future (European Commission, 
2002). Under this regulatory framework markets are defined and market power 
assessed using the same methodologies as under competition law (European 
Commission, 2002, Recital 24). In particular, in order to identify significant 
market power (SMP), the Commission’s Guidelines formulate a long list of cri-
teria indicating the existence of a dominant position. These criteria include: 
overall size of the undertaking, control of infrastructure not easily duplicated, 
technological advantages or superiority, absence of or low countervailing buying 
power, easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial resources, prod-
uct/services diversifications, economies of scale, economies of scope, vertical 
integration, a highly developed distribution and sales network, absence of poten-
tial competition, barriers to expansion (European Commission, 2002, Recital 
78).   
   4
The Commission’s Guidelines do not present a clear and economically well-
founded concept for localising network-specific market power. Even the criteria 
of general competition law are not considered consistently. Although it is 
stressed that the existence of a dominant position cannot be established on the 
sole basis of large market shares and would require a thorough and overall 
analysis of the economic characteristics of the relevant market (European   
Commission, 2002, Recital 78), it is argued that the doctrine of the ‘essential 
facilities’ would be less relevant for the purposes of ex ante applying Article 14 
of the Framework Directive than ex post applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
(European Commission, 2002, Recital 82).
7   
 
 
2.2  The large potential of the discretionary power of the European  
   Commission and the national regulators 
 
Compared to the long list of criteria stated in the Commission’s Guidelines 
(European Commission, 2002) the development of the three criteria in the 
Commission Recommendation of February 2003 seems to constitute progress 
(European Commission, 2003a, Recital 9). In order to justify the imposition of 
regulatory obligations on a given market, the following three criteria should be 
fulfilled: The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory entry bar-
riers whether of structural, legal or regulatory nature. The second criterion ad-
mits only those markets, the structure of which does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon. The third criterion is that applica-
tion of competition law alone would not adequately address the market failure(s) 
concerned (European Commission, 2003a, Recital 9). The focus on non-
transitory entry barriers seems to be a good starting point for an economically 
based regulation of remaining network-specific market power.  
 
                                                 
7   This is a definite step away from the Access Notice of August 1998 (Notice on the 
application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector - framework, relevant markets and principles (98/C 265/02, Official Journal of 
the European communities, C 265/2, 22.8.98), which extended the role of competi-
tion policy, pointing out the importance of ensuring non-discriminatory access to  
essential facilities.   5
The question remains to what extent the Commissions’ Decisions as well as the 
Decisions of the national regulators are constrained by such criteria and if not, 
how institutional reform should be designed to enforce these criteria on an eco-
nomically well-founded basis. However, in the same document (European 
Commission, 2003a, Annex) the Commission defined 18 markets, on which the 
imposition of regulatory obligations might be justified.
8 Such a list of serious 
candidates for sector-specific regulation can only be derived by means of an 
economically well-founded analysis. It seems obvious that this is not the case, 
considering the 18 markets defined in the Recommendation. Candidates for   
removal have already been pointed out (de Streel, 2004, p. 22), including all 
markets on the retail level (international, national, and local telephone services, 
access to public telephone service) as well as some markets on the wholesale 
level (transit services in the fixed public telephone network, wholesale trunk 
segments of leased lines etc.). It is interesting to remember that the market for 
wholesale trunk segments of leased lines (market 14), for example, was already 
characterised as competitive by the Commission in 1999.
9    
 
 
2.3  Increasing complexity of EU regulation: The 200 Commission  
   Decisions on Art. 7 Procedures 
 
Article 7 of the Framework Directive gives the European Commission the right 
to oversee the national regulatory measures, by way of the consultation proce-
dures. These procedures require national regulatory authorities to conduct a con-
                                                 
8   The list is based on Article 15 of the Framework Directive (Annex I). The product 
and service markets listed in the annex contain 7 markets on the retail level (includ-
ing international, national and local telephone services), as well as 11 markets on the 
wholesale level (including transit services in the fixed public telephone network, 
wholesale trunk segments of leased lines, and wholesale broadband access). 
9   “Major commercial investments in long-distance optical fibre infrastructure are un-
derway in Europe, and it is expected that several thousand kilometres of optical fibre 
will become operational by the early part of 2000, linking all major European cities. 
This massive investment in alternative infrastructure is expected to create for the first 
time significant competition for the incumbent operators’ leased line offers, in par-
ticular on their long-distance and cross-border leased line markets.” (European   
Commission, 1999, p. 4).   6
sultation on the regulatory measures they intend to take - comprising definition 
and analysis of relevant markets and the proposed imposition or removal of 
regulation on undertakings providing electronic communications networks or 
services - prior to adoption. The Commission may comment on the draft meas-
ures, and in certain cases, exercise its veto power requiring their withdrawal 
(Framework Directive, Art. 7., cif.4 b).
10   
 
The starting point for the market analysis of the national regulatory agencies is 
the Commission’s Recommendation on relevant markets (European Commis-
sion 2003a) and the Commission’s Guidelines on market analysis and assess-
ment of significant market power (European Commission 2002). The national 
regulatory agencies may define markets appropriate to national circumstances, 
particularly relevant geographic markets within their territories (European 
Commission 2003a, Recital 19).   
 
Since its inception two years ago, the Commission has assessed more than 200 
notifications and the figure is expected to increase further in the next year.
11 139 
of those notifications have been published until 8 September 2005.
12 There have 
been numerous Commission Decisions so far on each of the 7 different markets 
on the retail level, as well as on 10 different markets on the wholesale level.
13  
 
A closer look at the Commission’s Decisions on article 7 procedures reveals that 
the evaluation of significant market power is still strongly based on market share 
estimations.
14 The three criteria in the Commission’s Recommendation of   
                                                 
10  More detailed procedural rules are set out in European Commission 2003b, p. 13.  
11    Electronic communications: Commission delivers review of 200
th notification by 
Member States of  measures to improve competition, Brussels 14 July 2005, 
IP/05/926.  
12  http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/commissionsdecisions 
&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
13  Until now, there has been no case with respect to market 17: the wholesale national 
market for international roaming on public mobile networks.  
14  “Although market shares alone are not in themselves indicative of the presence or 
lack of market power, according to established case-law under EC competition rules
 
(F.N. 8 in original) a market share in excess of 50 % is, in the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances, in itself evidence of a dominant position 
(F.N. 9 in original) “
 (Commission 
Decision of 20 February 2004, Cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027, p.5).   7
February 2003 were only considered (if at all) as supplementary.
15 A consistent 
and economically well-founded analysis is lacking.  
 
Although a detailed analysis of this large set of decisions is beyond the scope of 
this paper, a brief survey of the cases already provides the following insights: In 
the notifications the need for ex ante regulation is typically not analysed accord-
ing to the three criteria pointing into the direction of an economic foundation of 
network-specific market power (European Commission, 2003, Recital 9). As a 
consequence of the missing economic analysis of network-specific market 
power a time-consuming and inconsistent administrative process has been initi-
ated, leaving the remaining necessity for sector-specific regulation unspecified.    
 
An illustrative example is the market for publicly available international tele-
phone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers (market 4) 
and non-residential customers (market 6). These markets are characterised by 
effective competition, irrespective of the country-specific characteristics, as fol-
lows immediately from the European Commission’s evaluation of long-distance 
and cross-border telecommunications markets (European Commission, 1999).
16 
As has been stated by the Finnish Regulatory Commission (Ficora), and agreed 
by the Commission, “it is relatively easy to enter the markets, since no signifi-
cant investments in the network infrastructure is needed 
(F.N. 6 in the original)”.
17  
    
Nevertheless, even for these markets contradictory conclusions have been drawn 
by different national regulatory authorities and equally accepted by the Euro-
pean Commission. The Swedish and Finnish regulatory agencies concluded that 
their international call markets for residential and non-residential users are effec-
                                                 
15  “On the basis of the analysis of the three criteria
 (F.N. 5 in original)  PTS concludes that the 
notified markets are characterised by law barriers to entry
 (F.N. 6 in original) . Despite this 
conclusion, PTS conducts a SMP analysis of the notified markets on the grounds that 
these markets have previously been regulated 
(F.N. 7 in original)  and that there is a link 
with the existing regulation in other, related markets” (EC Comments, 24. 06. 2005, 
Cases SE/2005/0195, SE/2005/0196, SE/2005/0197 and SE/2005/0198, p. 3).     
16  In network economics this fact is by now common knowledge (cf. Laffont, Tirole 
2000, p. 98; Knieps, 1997, pp. 327f.). See also the analysis in the next section 3.  
17  Commission’s Decision of 14. 07. 2005, Cases FI/2005/0201 and FI/2005/0202, p. 3.   8
tively competitive.
18 In Austria, the national regulatory authority stated that only 
the international call market for residential users is competitive, whereas the in-
ternational call market for business users still requires regulation.
19 In Hungary, 
Portugal, and Ireland both the international markets for residential and non-
residential users are considered to be in need of being regulated.
20  
 
This increasing complexity of EU regulation is resulting in a tangle of contradic-
tory Decisions and statements, involving also new markets such as interactive 
cable television, Internet etc. Whereas in the past sector-specific regulation has 
been applied in a discretionary manner in order to correct the rules of the market 
game, the really challenging task for the future seems to be the development and 
implementation of constitutional rules to provide statutory constraints for the 
regulatory authorities in order to guarantee predictable regulatory actions.  
 
 
3.  Proposal for the EU Review 2006: A disaggregated regulatory  
   contract 
 
It is well known from the positive theory of regulation that regulators have 
strong incentives to over-regulate, mix regulatory instruments in an unsuitable 
way, favour the application of detailed regulation and call for a heavy-handed 
supervision of firms (e.g. Stigler, 1971; Knieps, 1998). This is the very reason 
why an a priori “framing” Decision to limit the regulatory basis by statutory 
constraints is of particular importance.
21 In the following the design of a disag-
                                                 
18   EC Comments, 24. 06. 2005, Cases SE/2005/0195, SE/2005/0196, SE/2005/0197 
and SE/2005/0198. Commission’s Decision of 14. 07. 2005, Cases FI/2005/0201 and 
FI/2005/0202. 
19  EC Comments, 13.01.2005, Cases AT/2004/124 and AT/2004/125. 
20    EC Comments, 28.01.2005, Cases HU/2005/0132, HU/2005/0133, HU/2005/0134 
and HU/2005/0135; EC Comments, 25.06.2004, Cases PT/2004/0053, 
PT/2004/0054, PT/2004/0055, PT/2004/0056, PT/2004/0057, PT/2004/0058 and 
PT/2004/0059; EC Comments, 25.04.2004, Cases IE/2005/0158-159, Cases 
IE/2005/0160-161-162-163. 
21  The importance of statutory obligations to discipline the discriminatory power of 
regulatory agencies has been analysed in detail in Spulber, Besanko, 1992; Newbery, 
2000, chapter 2; Sidak, Spulber 1997; Gans, King, 2003.   9
gregated regulatory contract on the statutory level (EU Directives and national 
law) is elaborated, consisting of three major elements: limiting regulation to 
monopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting phasing-out potentials, and disaggregated 
application of sector-specific regulatory instruments.   
 
 
3.1  Limiting regulation to monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
An appropriate economic reference model that exposes the need for action to 
control market power in network sectors must be capable of grasping essential 
network characteristics (economies of scale, economies of scope, externalities, 
etc) without automatically associating them with market power. A case-
dependent combination of the criteria listed in the Commission’s Guidelines in 
order to identify significant market power without analytical foundation is not 
adequate to identify stable network-specific market power. The purpose of this 
section is to show that stable network-specific market power and the ensuing 
need for regulation only exist in the event of monopolistic bottlenecks.  
 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is central to the disaggregated regulatory 
approach in terms of locating network-specific market power in connection with 
the efforts to determine the minimum basis for regulation (cf. Knieps, 1997a, pp. 
327-331 ; Knieps, 1997b, pp. 362-368), the aim being to come up with a coher-
ent basis consistent with network economics which can be applied to all network 
sectors and which regardless of historical or institutional quirks provides justifi-
cation for ex ante regulatory measures. For the remaining network areas the  
application of general competition law is sufficient. In this context, the need for 
regulation is concerned in particular with the need to design a system for con-
trolling access to monopolistic bottlenecks and for charging users. The problems 
associated with monopolistic bottlenecks, and in particular the problem of net-
work access (Baumol, Willig, 1999, p. 44; Knieps, 2000, pp. 295-299; Laffont, 
Tirole, 2000, p. 98; Kuhlmann, Vogelsang, 2005, p. 34) are currently frequent 
topics of discussion in the context of network economics.  
   10
Network-specific market power can only be identified by consistently imple-
menting Stigler’s concept of market entry barriers. According to Stigler:  
“A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or 
every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter 
an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry” (Stigler, 
1968, p. 67). 
 
Provided inputs are available to active and potential market players under the 
same conditions, according to Stigler there are no barriers to entry. Therefore, 
economies of scale, for example, do not constitute entry barriers, provided new-
comers to the market also have access to the same cost function. Stigler’s con-
cept also implies that traditional competition parameters such as product differ-
entiation coupled with the need to build up a good reputation and develop 
goodwill, or the capital required are not entry barriers because they affect all  
active and potential players equally. In other words, these are situations where 




The conditions governing a monopolistic bottleneck are met when: 
(1)  a facility is necessary for reaching customers, i.e. if no second or third 
such facility exists, in other words if there is no active substitute. This is 
the case when due to economies of scale and economies of scope a natural 
monopoly exists and a single provider is able to make the facility avail-
able more cheaply than several providers;
23 
                                                 
22  On the other hand, the different entry barriers found, according to Bain (1956), in  
traditional industrial economics (economies of scale, product differentiation, high 
capital needs, etc.) are not reliable proof of stable market power (cf., for example, 
Schmalensee, 1989). Von Weizsäcker (1980a; 1980b) shows, for example, that   
reputation and goodwill are effective ways of reducing insecurity, which can enhance 
social well-being.  According to Stigler, the development of goodwill is not a barrier 
to market entry because it does not result in cost asymmetries between established 
firms and newcomers to the market.  
23  A natural monopoly exists when the cost function is subadditive throughout the rele-
vant range. In the case of single products, economies of scale are sufficient for there 
to be a natural monopoly (e.g. Baumol, 1977).   11
(2)  at the same time the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated as a way of 
controlling the active provider, in other words when there is no potential 
substitute. This is the case when the costs of the facility are irreversible.  
 
Consequently, network-specific market power in the hands of the established 
enterprise is only to be expected in those parts of networks which are character-
ised by a natural monopoly and irreversible costs. Although they are no longer 
relevant for the decision-making of the established enterprises, as far as potential 
competitors are concerned, irreversible costs are a crucial factor, insofar as they 
must decide whether to invest such costs in the market or not. Established firms 
therefore have lower decision-relevant costs than their potential rivals. This 
means there is room for strategic manoeuvring, with the result that inefficient 
production or profits no longer necessarily enable newcomers to enter the mar-
ket. The market power of the firm that enjoys such a monopolistic bottleneck is 
therefore stable, even if all market players are fully informed, all users are pre-




In the absence of irreversible costs, however, and as a result of the controlling 
effect of potential competition, even a natural monopoly does not possess stable 
market power,
25 regardless of the size of the relevant network operator’s market 
share, because inefficient providers of non market-oriented services will be re-
placed by new entrants, owing to the pressure of competition. In this case there 
is no need for regulation to limit the active operator’s control over the market.  
 
The bottleneck theory does not deny the information problems encountered to 
varying degrees on real markets. Ex ante stable market power cannot be deduced 
                                                 
24  This is the Bertrand Nash behavioural assumption based on the theory of contestable 
markets (cf., for example, Baumol, Panzar, Willig, 1982).   
25  In the absence of irreversible costs, there is no evidence in the case of a natural mo-
nopoly of market power capable of withstanding alternative behavioural assumptions 
(cf. Knieps, Vogelsang, 1982).  Market power based on the Cournot-Nash assump-
tion becomes immediately unstable with the switch to the Bertrand-Nash behavioural 
assumption. Action taken by competition authorities would therefore have to refer to 
behavioural assumptions that are difficult to verify in practice.    12
from the existence of information problems, however, insofar as markets tend to 
be efficient at (endogenously) developing institutions to overcome their infor-
mation problems. Switching costs, which occur in many areas of the economy, 
are no explanation for monopolistic bottleneck situations either. Examples of 
switching costs include monthly or annual season tickets for concerts that cannot 
be transferred if the holder moves house, or the costs incurred by firms when 
employees leave as soon as they have learnt the ropes, etc. They are no justifica-
tion for regulatory measures and can be left to the market’s own problem-
solving ability (cf., for example, von Weizsäcker, 1984; Tirole, 1989, Chapter 
8). The existence of network externalities is no justification for sector-specific 
regulation either. The essential feature of such externalities is that for an indi-
vidual the advantage of being part of a network depends not only on its technical 
specifications – its standard – but also on how many others are involved in it. 
Where there are positive network externalities, the benefit for the individual in-
creases with the number of other network members, in other words the number 
of those using the same standard. In the absence of network-specific market 
power, negotiations between network operators can prove effective because both 
sides stand to benefit from the agreements.
26 In contrast, access to bottlenecks 
does present a need for regulation, given that network-specific market power 
allows for strategic manoeuvring that also hampers full enjoyment of positive 
externalities associated with access to the network (cf., e.g., Blankart, Knieps, 
1995, pp. 288 f.). 
 
Indeed, one of the essential features of the ability of competition to operate on 
the free markets for network services is that corporate strategies such as product 
and price differentiation, the build-up of goodwill, the development of an effi-
cient distribution network, etc. can also be used for strategic purposes. Informa-
tion problems (search costs, asymmetric information, etc.) can also play a role.
27 
                                                 
26  This does not necessarily imply that the benefits of all network externalities are ex-
ploited. If, for example, consumers have heterogeneous preferences with respect to 
alternative technologies and gateway costs are significant, a competitive result of 
several network islands will arise (e.g. Blankart, Knieps, 1993, pp. 44-46). 
27  The Bertrand Nash assumption, based on the contestable markets theory, does not set 
out to deny the information problems encountered on real markets either. Stable 
market power cannot be deduced simply from the existence of information problems,   13
This must not lead to the opposite conclusion, however, namely that basically 
competition does not work on markets for network services, nor does it mean 
that general competition law should not be applied on these markets. What it 
does mean, however, is that, as on any other market characterised by organized 
competition, the burden of proof as to the existence of market power and as to 
whether such power is abused, rests with the competition authorities. In contrast 
to general ex ante regulation, such interference in competition should always be 




3.2  Exploiting phasing-out potentials 
 
One has to differentiate between markets which already are competitive and 
markets loosing the characteristics of monopolistic bottlenecks due to techno-
logical change.  
 
3.2.1   Competitive long-distance networks 
In the meantime the markets for long-distance telecommunications services are 
characterised by active and potential competition. Inefficient suppliers are re-
placed by less expensive ones because there is free market entry. Even when the 
market share of a service provider is high, inefficient production or services not 
geared to market requirements will soon lead to a considerable loss in market 
shares, because customers are not tied to a specific supplier and can react with-
out delay to price cuts on the market. Excessive prices and inadequate network 
quality would result in switching to alternative suppliers, which would appear on 
                                                                                                                                                          
insofar as markets tend to be very efficient at (endogenously) developing institutions 
to overcome their information problems, for example, by building up goodwill.   
Conversely, stable market power is also to be found in natural monopolies with irre-
versible costs when all market players have all the information they need.  
28  In this context, the competition authorities must weigh up two potential sources of 
error. Firstly, false positives can occur when the authorities interfere in the competi-
tion process, even though competition is working and there is no need at all for  
action in terms of competition policy.  Secondly, false negatives occur when the 
competition authorities fail to act, even though competition policy calls for action.   14
the market immediately, due to the possibility of free market entry. Thus there 
remains no regulatory need for disciplining the market power of alternative net-
work providers. 
 
The market for long-distance transmission capacity is competitive (cf. Laffont, 
Tirole, 2000, p. 98). There have been a large number of newcomers building 
transnational network infrastructure as input for Internet backbone capacity (cf. 
Elixmann, 2000, p. 7). Another possibility is to lease transmission capacity from 
several alternative providers of network infrastructure. In Germany, for exam-
ple, a larger number of carriers possess their own long-distance infrastructures 
(cf. Knieps, 2004, pp. 9-11). The telecommunications transport capacity is read-
ily available today from a variety of providers (cf. Kende, 2000, p. 25).  
 
As a consequence, all markets on the retail level as well as those markets on the 
wholesale level focussing on long-distance networks should be excluded from 
the list of possibly regulated markets 
 
3.2.2   Increasing competition within the local loop 
Due to technical progress it is important to view the localisation of monopolistic 
bottlenecks in a dynamic context. Therefore, one objective in the definition of 
access conditions must be not to impede infrastructure competition, i.e. not to 
destroy incentives for either research and development activities or innovations 
and investments on the facilities level. This is the only way to reach a balance 
between service and infrastructure competition. Consequently, ever since the 
comprehensive opening of the telecommunications market, the pressure of inno-
vation has increased in local networks, too. This has led to considerable techno-
logical variety (e.g. optical fibre, wireless networks, CATV networks, satellite 
technology) and a consequent increase in varieties of network access. As a con-
sequence, broadband technologies lose the characteristics of a natural monopoly. 
In addition, effective platform competition becomes relevant, where alternative 
providers have complete control of all aspects of their networks and the subse-
quent services. Because of these rapid developments, the local loop facilities in   15
bigger cities and agglomerations are increasingly losing their character of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks.  
 
In order to gain a complete overview of the competition potentials it is necessary 
to not only focus on the traditional copper cable technology (in the local loop), 
but to also take into consideration the existence of alternative (broadband) ac-
cess technologies. These alternatives vary within different parts of a country, but 
also between different countries, depending on the different histories of the net-
works and the strategies of the market participants etc. It is therefore important 
that the phasing-out potential should be properly identified by the regulators, 
including the emergence of new access alternatives in the relevant market.  
 
Although it is not possible at this point to predict exactly how long it will take 
for the monopolistic bottlenecks in the local loop to disappear completely, there 
cannot be any doubt that the regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks has to be 
viewed in a dynamic context, so that the potential for phasing out sector-specific 
regulation in telecommunications can be fully exhausted. Network access possi-
bilities depend on the peculiarities of different relevant geographic markets; in 
any case all relevant alternatives should be taken into account. 
 
From this perspective the Commission’s Decisions based on Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive again contain inconsistencies. Although wholesale access 
provided over alternative infrastructures is also considered to be part of market 
12 (European Commission, 2003a, Annex I), the 26 Decisions of the Commis-
sion reveal a mixed picture. For example, although the Danish regulatory au-
thority was convinced that broadband access via cable TV networks belonged to 
the wholesale broadband access market, the Commission was not, finally result-
ing in a notice of withdrawal.




                                                 
29  Notice of withdrawal, Case DK/2005/0182: Wholesale Broadband Access Market in 
Denmark.   16
3.3  Disaggregated application of sector-specific regulatory instruments 
 
3.3.1  Minimal regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks 
It is traditionally assumed that local networks constitute monopolistic bottle-
necks, for which neither active nor potential substitutes are available. The EU 
regulation on unbundled access to the local loop proceeds from this assumption 
and concludes that there is a remaining need for regulation of the incumbent  
operator’s local access network. To the extent and as long as local networks 
constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, ex ante regulation seems justified. Non-
discriminatory access to bottleneck facilities has to be guaranteed (e.g. Knieps, 
1997a, p. 328). Since unregulated tariffs would allow excessive profits to the 
owners of monopolistic bottlenecks, the instrument of price-cap regulation 
should be introduced (e.g. Beesley, Littlechild, 1989). Its major purpose is to 
regulate the level of prices, taking into account the inflation rate (consumer price 
index) minus a percentage for expected productivity increase. It seems important 
to restrict such price-cap regulation to those areas of telecommunications   
networks where market power due to monopolistic bottlenecks is a regulatory 
problem. In all other subparts of telecommunications networks price-setting 
should be left to the competitive market forces. 
 
Concentrating on the regulation of the “last mile” does indeed constitute the one 
remaining task of a tailored sector-specific market power regulation, to the   
extent that access alternatives are not available. Non-discriminatory access to 
bottleneck facilities must be guaranteed for all competitors.  
 
3.3.2 Avoiding  end-to-end  regulation 
Regulatory instruments can be differentiated according to whether they are lim-
ited to the bottleneck areas (disaggregated regulation) or applied globally (end-
to-end), including the competitive segments (e.g. Laffont, Tirole, 2000, chapt. 
4). Since the application of regulatory rules is not costless and may also be 
abused strategically to disturb market forces, the advantage of the disaggregated 
regulatory approach is the strict limitation of the regulatory basis to bottleneck   17
services. From an economic policy point of view, the use of ex ante sector-
specific regulation involves massive interference with the market process and 
must therefore be supported by a well-founded justification. Even if, due to the 
nature of networks, bottleneck areas are complementary to the other parts of the 
network, there is no reason whatsoever for end-to-end regulation and a general 
use of regulatory tools. Both the findings of network economics and the experi-
ence with different network sectors show that tailor-made bottleneck regulation 
is the only way. Generally, a distinction has to be made between the existence of 
network-specific market power due to monopolistic bottlenecks and the question 
as to whether this market power is transferred to complementary parts of the 
market. Even if a transfer of market power from a bottleneck to other partial 
markets were incentive-compatible, this would not in any way mean that the 
bottleneck and the other partial markets belong to the same market. The basic 
idea of the disaggregated regulatory approach employed in network economics 
is the very fact that it is possible to distinguish between those parts of the net-
work that constitute bottlenecks and those parts that are characterised by active 
and potential competition. The all-important task then is to ensure adequate 
regulation of bottlenecks in order enable equal opportunities for competition on 
the other markets. 
 
This leads to the disaggregated regulatory approach which not only identifies 
network-specific market power properly as monopolistic bottlenecks but also 
designs a combination of regulatory instruments limited to the bottleneck 
(Knieps, 1997a, p. 331). Price-cap regulation limited to monopolistic bottleneck 
services (wholesale level) combined with accounting separation and technical 
regulation (e.g. number portability, preselection) is sufficient to deal with the 
problem of non-discriminatory access. Although access regulation cannot be 
perfect, it moves regulatory attention into the right direction.  
 
3.3.3 No  access  holidays 
In recent years the focus of regulatory attention has increasingly shifted towards 
the incentives for investment. From an economic point of view the relation be-
tween access pricing to monopolistic bottlenecks and its linkage with investment   18
incentives has to be analysed (e.g. Newbery, 2000; Valletti, 2003). In this con-
text the role of access holidays has also been discussed. Access holidays mean a 
significant period during which an investor is free from access regulation. The 
idea is that such a holiday will increase investment incentives by allowing   
profits unhindered by regulatory intervention (Gans, King, 2003, p. 164).  
 
Access holidays can only be a relevant concept if regulatory problems of   
network-specific market power still exist. With respect to market power two 
questions have to be considered. Firstly, does a new investment create network-
specific market power? If not, sector-specific regulation is superfluous.   
Secondly, do new investments phase out the bottleneck nature of the existing 
network infrastructure? Since the comprehensive opening of the telecommunica-
tions market, the pressure of innovation has increased in local networks, too, 
leading to an increasing variety of network access products. This has led to a 
considerable disappearance of monopolistic bottlenecks within the local loops.  
 
The basic argument in favour of access holidays is the negative incentive for 
investments caused by expected regulatory opportunism. Translated into the 
context of the truncation problem, stated e.g. in Gans and King (2003), ex post 
regulatory opportunism of the regulatory agency is taken as (exogenously) 
given. In the decision trees considered, the only asymmetry between ex ante and 
ex post is a random state of the world, which materialises between the ex post 
and ex ante periods, observable as common knowledge. Due to the sequential 
nature of investment decisions (ex ante) and regulation of access tariffs (ex post) 
a regulation-induced hold-up problem would arise. The truncation problem 
would result to reward only ex post successful projects, whereas the ex ante 
risks of project failure would not be compensated.
30 Due to the path-dependency 
of network infrastructures the hypothetical scenario of green-field approaches of 
new infrastructure networks overstates the ex ante risks, although the incentive 
problem for the gradual renewal of bottleneck infrastructures should not be ig-
nored. In any case, from an investor’s point of view all relevant ex ante risks 
                                                 
30  Under certain conditions it can even be shown that regulated access prices equal to 
short run variable costs would result in a unique Nash-equilibrium and the utility 
would not invest (Newbery, 2000, pp. 34-36).   19
should be compensated. The really challenging task is therefore the design of a 
credible regulatory contract taking into account the problem of regulatory oppor-
tunism. Whereas network-specific market power should be disciplined by disag-
gregated regulation, at the same time the financial viability of the networks 
should also be granted.  
 
The question arises whether access holidays are the adequate answer to the prob-
lem of regulatory opportunism. The starting point is how markets solve the 
problem of opportunism. Opportunistic behaviour between market participants 
can be credibly excluded by means of incentive compatible contracts. As long as 
all parties may benefit from the ex ante investment decisions, incentives occur to 
apply credible devices for dealing with ex post cheating behaviour. Under the 
assumption of complete information a well-specified contract can be designed 
between all parties involved creating incentives for ex ante irreversible invest-
ments and no ex post cheating incentives (e.g. Kleindorfer, Knieps, 1982). As 
Williamson (1983, p. 526) has shown, a security bond equal in amount to the 
irreversible investment would serve the purpose of a perfect hostage. In a world 
of incomplete information and subsequent incentives for idiosyncratic contracts 
(e.g. Williamson, 1979) the ex ante risk of investments cannot be perfectly de-
termined. Consequently, perfect hostages to avoid opportunistic behaviour by 
the firm involved do not exist; nevertheless, adequate inperfect hostages can be 
developed (Williamson, 1983, pp. 527 f.).  
 
Under the assumption of a welfare-maximising regulator in a similar way a 
complete incentive-compatible regulatory contract can be implemented. In par-
ticular, instead of postulating ex post regulatory power, under such circum-
stances of complete information it is feasible to design a complete regulatory 
contract ex ante such as to allow the compensation of the ex ante risk of irre-
versible investment. In a world of incomplete information again only an incom-
plete regulatory contract can be designed.  
 
Since it is well known that regulatory authorities cannot be forced into welfare-
maximising behaviour, the question arises whether opportunistic behaviour can 
be excluded by the design and implementation of adequate hostages. Within the   20
relevant institutional context it cannot be expected that the regulatory authorities 
can be disciplined by such an adequate hostage. Regulatory authorities as part of 
the bureaucracy cannot be fined as consequence of inadequate behaviour. As a 
consequence, it is only by means of a statutory constraint that opportunistic be-
haviour by the regulatory authorities can be disciplined.
31 Therefore the regula-
tory agency has to be committed by statutes to allow the compensation of the ex 
ante risk of irreversible investment.   
 
One cornerstone of the EU Directives is the financial viability of the networks. 
In the context of the EU Review on telecommunications the Access Directive 
indicates the necessity that: “National regulatory authorities shall take into ac-
count the investment made by the operator and allow him a reasonable rate of 
return on adequate capital employed, taking into account the risks involved”.
32 
Whereas the disaggregated regulatory contract has still to be implemented 
within the Review 2006, the regulatory authorities already have to take into   
account the statutory constraint of guaranteeing the financial viability of the net-
work providers. Although even an omnipotent regulator is not able to calculate 
precisely the ex ante risk of investment under the situation of incomplete infor-
mation, the statutory constraint of financial viability can be considered as an 
adequate substitute for the institutional infeasible (incomplete) hostage.  
 
It has be shown that the problem of regulatory opportunism is not caused by the 
nature of ex ante irreversible investments per se, but is based on the more   
general problem that regulatory agencies cannot be committed to welfare-
maximising behaviour. Therefore, the regulatory agencies have to be con-
strained by statutes, not only to enforce the disaggregated regulatory contract in 
order to properly discipline market power, but also to allow the compensation of 
                                                 
31  Regulatory theory has a long tradition of dealing with problems of incomplete regu-
latory contracts, including the problems of political control of regulatory agencies, 
involving policy makers, the agency, and the regulated firms (e.g. Goldberg, 1976; 
Spulber, Besanko, 1992; Sidak, Spulber, 1997). 
32  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and  interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive, Art. 13/1), OJ L108/16, 24.4. 2002.   21
ex ante risks of irreversible investments. To conclude, the instrument of access 





The increasing complexity of EU regulation is resulting in a tangle of contradic-
tory decisions and statements, involving also new markets, such as interactive 
cable television, Internet etc. Whereas in the past sector-specific regulation has 
been applied in a discretionary manner in order to correct the rules of the market 
game, the really challenging task for the future seems to be the development and 
implementation of statutory constraints for the regulatory authorities in order to 
guarantee a predictable regulation of market power. For this purpose the design 
and implementation of a disaggregated regulatory contract on the statutory level 
(EU Directives and national law) is derived, which should be an essential prin-
ciple in the EU Review 2006. Its basic components consist of limiting regulation 
to monopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting the phasing-out potentials, and a disag-
gregated application of regulatory instruments. In contrast, the problem of op-
portunistic regulatory behaviour with respect to irreversible investments can be 
solved by the application of the already existing statutory constraint of the 





Bain, J.S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 
Baumol, W.J. (1977), On the Proper Cost Test for Natural Monopolies in a Multiproduct  
Industry, American Economic Review, 67, 809-822 
Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C., Willig, R.D. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of   
Industry Structure, San Diego 
Baumol, W.J., Willig R.D. (1999), Competitive Rail Regulation Rules, Should Price Ceilings 
Constrain Final Products or Inputs?, Journal of Transportation Economics and Policy,   
33/1, 43-54  
Beesley, M.E., Littlechild, S.C. (1989), The regulation of privatized monopolies in the United 
Kingdom, Rand Journal of Economics, 20/3, 454-472   22
Blankart, Ch.B., Knieps, G. (1989), What Can We Learn From Comparative Institutional 
Analysis? The Case of Telecommunications, Kyklos, 42/4 579-598 
Blankart, Ch.B., Knieps, G. (1993), Network Evolution, in Wagener H.-J. (Ed.), On the   
Theory and Policy of Systemic Change, Heidelberg 
Blankart, Ch.B., G. Knieps (1995), Market-oriented Open Network Provision, Information 
Economics and Policy, 7, 283-296 
Elixmann, D. (2000), Wettbewerbsintensität auf dem Markt für Übertragungskapazität,   
Wissenschaftliches Institut für Kommunikationsdienste, Bad Honnef: WIK Newsletter, 
No. 41, December, 6-9 
European Commission (1998), Directorate General XIII ONP COMMITTEE, Subject: The 
1999 Review of the Telecommunications Regulatory Framework, ONP COM 98-42, 
Brussels, 11 September  
European Commission (1999), Commission Recommendation on leased lines interconnection 
pricing in a liberalised telecommunications market, Brussels, 24.11.1999, C (1999) 3863 
European Commission (2002), Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of signifi-
cant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communica-
tions network and services, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 165/6-31, 
11.7.2002. 
European Commission (2003a), Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product 
and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante 
regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks 
and services (2003/311/EC), Official Journal of the European Union, 8.5.2003, L 114/45-
49.  
European Commission (2003b), Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time lim-
its and consultations provided for in Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic commu-
nications networks and services (2003/561/EC), Official Journal of the European Union, 
30.7.2003, L 190/13-18. 
Gans, J., King, S. (2003), Access Holidays for Network Infrastructure Investment, Agenda 
10/2, 163-178 
Goldberg, V.P. (1976), Regulation and administered contracts, Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 
426-448 
Kende, M. (2000), The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, Federal Commu-
nications Commission, Washington: OPP Working Paper No. 32 
Kleindorfer, P., Knieps, G. (1982), Vertical Integration and Transaction Specific Sunk Costs, 
European Economic Review, 19/1, 71-87  
Knieps, G. (1997a), Phasing out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Telecommunica-
tions, Kyklos, 50/3, 325-339 
Knieps, G. (1997b), The Concept of Open Network Provision in Large Technical Systems 
EURAS Yearbook of Standardization, 1, 357-369 
   23
Knieps, G. (1998), Costing and Pricing of Interconnection Services in a Liberalized European 
Telecommunications Market, in: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies 
(ed.), Telecommunications Reform in Germany: Lessons and Priorities, Washington D.C., 
51-73 
Knieps, G. (2000), Interconnection and Network Access, Fordham International Law Journal, 
23/Symposium, 90-115 
Knieps, G. (2004), Privatisation of network industries in Germany –A disaggregated   
approach, CESifo Working Papers No. 1188, forthcoming in: CESifo Konferenzband 
„Privatisation Experiences in the EU“, MIT Press, 2005 
Knieps, G., I. Vogelsang (1982), The Sustainability Concept under Alternative Behavioural 
Assumptions, Bell Journal of Economics, 13/1, 234-241 
Kuhlmann, A., Vogelsang, I. (2005), The German Electricity Sector – finally on the move?  
CESifo, DICE Report, 3/2, 30-39 
Laffont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (2000), Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, London 
Newbery, D.M. (2000), Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London 
Schmalensee, R. (1989): Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performances, in: Schmalen-
see, R., R. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam et al., 951-
1009 
Sidak, J.G., Spulber, D.F. (1997), Deregulatory Taking and the Regulatory Contract,   
Cambridge University Press  
Spulber, D.F., Besanko, D. (1992), Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8/1, 126-154 
Stigler, G.J. (1968), Barriers to Entry, Economies of Scale, and Firm Size, in: G.J. Stigler, 
The Organization of Industry, Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 67-70 
Stigler, G.J. (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 2, 3-21 
de Streel, A. (2004), A New Regulatory Paradigma for European Electronic Communications: 
On the Fallacy of the ‘Less Regulation’ Rhetoric, Revised Paper ITS Conference, Berlin   
Tirole, J. (1989), The Theory of Industrial Organization, 2nd Printing, Cambridge et al. 
Valletti, T.M. (2003), The theory of access pricing and its linkage with investment incentives, 
Telecommunications Policy, 27, 659-675  
Weizsäcker, C.C. von (1980a), A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, Bell Journal of   
Economics, 11, 399-420 
Weizsäcker, C.C. von (1980b), Barriers to Entry: A Theoretical Treatment, Lecture Notes in 
Economics and Mathematical Systems, Berlin et al. 
Weizsäcker, C.C. von (1984), The Costs of Substitution, Econometrica, 52/5, 1085-1116 
Williamson, O.E. (1979), Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual rela-
tions, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 232-261 
Williamson, O.E. (1983), Credible Commitments: using Hostages to Support Exchange, 
American Economics Review, 73/4, 519-540   24
Als Diskussionsbeiträge des  
Instituts für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik 
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. 
sind zuletzt erschienen: 
 
84.   G. Knieps: Wholesale/retail pricing in telecom markets, erschienen in: Contributions to 
the WIK Seminar on „Regulatory Economics”, Königswinter, 19-21 November 2001, 
Bad Honnef, 2002, S. 9-20 
85.   G. Knieps: Wettbewerb auf den Ferntransportnetzen der deutschen Gaswirtschaft: Eine 
netzökonomische Analyse, erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft (ZfE) 26/3, 
2002, S. 171-180 
86.   G.  Knieps: Entscheidungsorientierte Ermittlung der Kapitalkosten in liberalisierten   
Netzindustrien, erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB), 73. Jg., Heft 9, 
2003, S. 989-1006 
87.   G.  Knieps:  Costing und Pricing in Netzindustrien, erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der 
Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaftlichen  Gesellschaft: Investitionsentscheidungen und 
Kostenmanagement in Netzindustrien, Reihe B, B 262, 2003, S. 7-25 
88.   G.  Knieps:  Does the system of letter conveyance constitute a bottleneck resource?   
erscheint in: Proceedings of the 7th Königswinter Seminar „Contestability and Barriers 
to Entry in Postal Markets“, November 17-19, 2002 
89.   G. Knieps: Preisregulierung auf liberalisierten Telekommunikationsmärkten, erschienen 
in: Telekommunikations- & Medienrecht, TKMR-Tagungsband, 2003, S. 32-37 
90.   H.-J. Weiß: Die Doppelrolle der Kommunen im ÖPNV, erschienen in: Internationales 
Verkehrswesen, Jg. 55 (2003), Nr. 7+8 (Juli/Aug.), S. 338-342 
91.   G. Knieps: Mehr Markt beim Zugang zu den Start- und Landerechten auf europäischen 
Flughäfen, erschienen in: Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik 96, 
Juni 2003, S. 43-46 
92.   G. Knieps: Versteigerungen und Ausschreibungen in Netzsektoren: Ein disaggregierter 
Ansatz, erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaftlichen Gesell-
schaft: Versteigerungen und Ausschreibungen in Verkehrs- und Versorgungsnetzen: 
Praxiserfahrungen und Zukunftsperspektiven, Reihe B, B 272, 2004, S.11-28 
93.   G. Knieps: Der Wettbewerb und seine Grenzen: Netzgebundene Leistungen aus öko-
nomischer Sicht, erschienen in: Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (Hrsg.), Verbrau-
cherschutz in netzgebundenen Märkten – wieviel Staat braucht der Markt?, Dokumenta-
tion der Tagung vom 18. November 2003, Berlin, 2004, S. 11-26 
94.   G. Knieps: Entgeltregulierung aus der Perspektive des disaggregierten Regulierungs-
ansatzes, erschienen in: Netzwirtschaften&Recht (N&R), 1.Jg., Nr.1, 2004, S. 7-12 
95.   G. Knieps: Neuere Entwicklungen in der Verkehrsökonomie: Der disaggregierte An-
satz, erschienen in: Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hrsg.), 
Symposium „Transportsysteme und Verkehrspolitik“, Vorträge 17, Schöningh-Verlag, 
Paderborn, 2004, S. 13-25   25
96.   G.  Knieps: Telekommunikationsmärkte zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb, er-
schienen in: Nutzinger, H.G. (Hrsg.), Regulierung, Wettbewerb und Marktwirtschaft, 
Festschrift für Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, Verlag Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003, 
S. 203-220 
97.   G.  Knieps: Wettbewerb auf den europäischen Transportmärkten: Das Problem der 
Netzzugänge, erschienen in: Fritsch, M. (Hrsg.), Marktdynamik und Innovation – Ge-
dächtnisschrift für Hans-Jürgen Ewers, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2004, S. 221-236 
98.   G.  Knieps: Verkehrsinfrastruktur, erschienen in: Akademie für Raumforschung und 
Landesplanung (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch der Raumordnung, Hannover 2005, S. 1213-
1219 
99.   G. Knieps: Limits to the (De-)Regulation of Transport Services, erscheint in: EMCT 
Round Table 129, Paris, 2004 
100.  G. Knieps: Privatisation of network industries in Germany –A disaggregated approach – 
erscheint in: CESifo Konferenzband „Privatisation Experiences in the EU“, MIT Press, 
2005 
101.  G. Knieps: Competition in the post-trade markets: A network economic analysis of the 
securities business, July 2004, revised version: March 2005 
102.  G. Knieps: Information and communication technologies in Germany: Is there a remain-
ing role for sector specific regulations?, erscheint in: Moerke, A., Storz, C. (Hrsg), Insti-
tutions and Learning in New Industries, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005 
103.  G. Knieps: Von der Theorie angreifbarer Märkte zur Theorie monopolistischer Bottle-
necks, November 2004, revidierte Fassung: Juni 2005 
104.  G. Knieps: Competition, Regulation and Privatisation: The Railroads and Telecommu-
nications Network Industries in Germany, December 2004  
105.  G. Knieps: Aktuelle Vorschläge zur Preisregulierung natürlicher Monopole, erscheint 
in: Tagungsband zum 38. Forschungsseminar Radein, Neuere Entwicklungen in der   
Infrastrukturpolitik, 2005 
106.  G. Aberle: Zukünftige Entwicklung des Güterverkehrs: Sind Sättigungsgrenzen erkenn-
bar? Februar 2005 
107.  G.  Knieps: Versorgungssicherheit und Universaldienste in Netzen: Wettbewerb mit 
Nebenbedingungen? erschienen in: Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Verkehrswissenschaft-
lichen Gesellschaft: Versorgungssicherheit und Grundversorgung in offenen Netzen, 
Reihe B, B 285, 2005, S. 11-25 
108. H.-J. Weiß: Die Potenziale des Deprival Value-Konzepts zur entscheidungsorientierten 
Bewertung von Kapital in liberalisierten Netzindustrien, Juni 2005 
109.  G. Knieps: Telecommunications markets in the stranglehold of EU regulation: On the 
need for a disaggregated regulatory contract, erscheint in: Journal of Network Industries 
 